"Fetch!"

The Willie Horton ad used by George H. W. Bush in his 1988 presidential campaign is considered to be one of the most effective political ads in U.S. history. It's also the prototype for the use of symbolic racism in political campaigns. Brad Ashford is a Democrat running for Congress in Nebraska's 2nd District. The National Republican Campaign Committee is spending $170,000 to run the following TV spot in support of his opponent, incumbent Lee Terry.

The ad is technically correct. Nikko Jenkins was released from prison under a Nebraska law that allows early release for good behavior, and went on to murder four people. Ashford supported this law while a member of the state legislature--as, presumably, a majority of Nebraska politicians did.

To call this an example of "dog whistle politics" may be to credit it with more subtlety than it actually shows.

By the way, the U.S. held 2.23 million people in prisons and jails in 2012, seven times the number in 1972, and by far the highest rate of imprisonment in the world. It will be difficult to reduce these numbers if politicians who vote for prison term reductions are held responsible for any recidivism that results.

You may also be interested in reading:

Dog Whistle Politics

Another Dog Whistle

Voter ID and Race, Part 2

In Part 1, I presented evidence that racially prejudiced individuals are more likely to support voter ID laws. Please read it before continuing.

Of course, public opinion does not automatically translate in social policy. In 2012, Bentele and O'Brien published a study in which they used multiple regression to examine what state-level variables were most strongly associated with both the proposal and passage of voter ID laws. The following variables predicted proposal and passage of restrictive legislation:

• Republicans controlled both houses of the legislature and the governorship. 83% of voting restrictions were passed by Republican-controlled legislatures.
• The state had become increasingly competitive in the last presidential election. Note that passage of voter ID laws required both increased competitiveness and Republican control. Those states that had become more competitive but had Democrats in control were less likely to pass voter ID laws.
• The state had a higher proprtion of African-American and Latino residents, and minority and low income turnout had increased in the last presidential election.
• There were more allegations of voter fraud. This variable had less impact than the other three. Note also that very few allegations of voter fraud have been substantiated.

Their study is entitled “Jim Crow 2.0.”

What about the individual legislators who vote for voter ID laws? Earlier this year, Mendez and Grose reported an experiment in which 1871 state legislators from 14 states with relatively high Latino populations received an e-mail from an apparent constituent asking whether a driver's license was required in order to vote. The legislators were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups. The e-mail either came from an Anglo (Jacob Smith) or a Latino (Santiago Rodriguez) man, and was written either in English or Spanish. The dependent measure was whether or not the legislator replied. Here are the results:

	Supports Voter ID	Does Not Support Voter ID
Anglo Name/English	45.0%	50.3%
Latino Name/English	27.5%	43.4%
Anglo Name/Spanish	10.1%	12.5%
Latino Name/Spanish	1.1%	11.7%

The results are clearest with the English-language e-mail. Those who supported voter ID were 17.5% more likely to respond to the Anglo constituent, while those who did not support voter ID were 6.9% more likely to respond to the Anglo constituent. Response rates were depressed considerably when the e-mail was in Spanish, but the same pattern was obtained. Supporters of voter ID were more likely to discriminate against Latino constituents.

Did the legislators themselves decide whether or not to answer the e-mail, or was it a staff member? It probably doesn't matter, since legislators hire like-minded staff members.

The authors claim that the experiment shows discriminatory intent on the part of legislators who supported voter ID. It could be argued that Republican legislators cast their vote for partisan reasons, and the fact that they also happened to be prejudiced was coincidental. However, not all Republicans supported voter ID, and further analysis showed that those Republicans who voted in favor of voter ID were more likely to discriminate against the Latino constituent than those Republicans who voted against it. (No Democrats in the entire sample supported voter ID laws.)

I'm not suggesting that prejudice and political partisanship are separate alternative explanations for support for voter suppression, either among legislators or the general public. It is likely that Republicans support these laws both because they harbor racial resentment and because the laws are advantageous to their party. In fact, in the last six years, attitudes toward a variety of political issues, such as health care, have become more strongly correlated with racial attitudes. The Republican Party has gradually evolved into an unabashedly racist party, much like the neo-Nazi parties of Europe.

I woke up yesterday morning to the following headline: “GOP calls for travel ban for West Africa over Ebola.” Will Republican Congresspeople be willing to support adequate financial aid for Ebola-stricken countries, or will they use fiscal austerity as an excuse to throw West African Black people under the bus?

You may also be interested in reading:

Voter ID and Race, Part 1

Don't Forget Not to Vote

Old-Fashioned Racism

Another Dog Whistle

After signing his landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, President Lyndon Johnson is said to have become depressed. When asked what was troubling him, he said, “I think we just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come.” He was wrong. It was not just the South. Although Johnson won that fall, since 1964 a majority of whites have voted for the Republican candidate in every presidential election. The last column of the table shows the Republican margin of victory among white voters.

Year	Republican Candidate	Democratic Candidate	Margin
1964	Goldwater	Johnson	-29%
1968	Nixon	Humphrey	16%
1972	Nixon	McGovern	40%
1976	Ford	Carter	4%
1980	Reagan	Carter	20%
1984	Reagan	Mondale	32%
1988	Bush I	Dukakis	20%
1992	Bush I	Clinton	2%
1996	Dole	Clinton	2%
2000	Bush II	Gore	13%
2004	Bush II	Kerry	17%
2008	McCain	Obama	12%
2012	Romney	Obama	20%

In Dog Whistle Politics, Ian Haney Lopez makes a strong case for the argument that race has been the driving force in American politics since the '60s. Beginning with Nixon in 1968, the Republican Party developed a winning strategy of appealing to white voters with messages based on symbolic racism. One of the results is that the Republicans have increasingly become the “white man's party.” A new set of studies by Maureen Craig and Jennifer Richeson of Northwestern University suggests that what is now a bad situation is likely to become worse.

The Census Bureau projects that by 2042, the US will become a majority-minority nation. That is, more than 50% of Americans will be non-whites. The authors hypothesized that this information is threatening to white voters, and making it salient will cause them to shift toward a more conservative ideology and become more likely to vote Republican. The information is, in effect, a dog whistle, that Republicans will be able to use to their advantage in future elections.

This is not the first time that threats have been shown to lead to conservative shifts. For example, American political opinion moved sharply in the conservative direction following the 9/11 attacks. In controlled experiments, proponents of terror management theory have shown that asking participants to think about their own death leads to conservative shifts in social and political attitudes and increased support for then-President George W. Bush.

The Craig and Richeson article presents three increasingly impressive experiments. The first is an internet study of a random sample of white Independent voters—that is, voters not affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic Party—living in the Western US. California is already a majority-minority state, and in one condition, respondents were informed of this fact. In the control condition, they were told that Hispanics had become roughly equal in number to blacks in the US. Participants were then asked to indicate the extent to which they leaned toward one of the two major parties, and to rate their political attitudes on a 5-point scale from “very liberal” to “very conservative.” The results of the political leaning question are shown below.

People informed of the majority-minority status of California also rated their political attitudes as significantly more conservative than the control group.

A second experiment used a random sample of white American adults from all regions and political parties. Some of the participants—the racial shift condition—were told that America would become a majority-minority nation in 2042, while those in the control group were given information about geographic mobility. Attitudes were measures toward five social policies, such as immigration and health care reform. The authors proposed that the conservative shift was mediated by group status threat. This was measured by two questions about whether the American way of life is threatened, and whether conditions in the US are getting better or worse. Three other potential mediators of the conservative shift were measured, but, as expected, none of them panned out.

As in study 1, the participants in the racial shift condition shifted in the conservative direction on the five attitudes and those in the control group did not. Those in the racial shift condition also showed greater evidence of group status threat, and, as predicted, group status threat mediated the relationship between the racial shift information and political conservatism. (See my earlier post explaining how mediation is inferred.)

Finally, if the conservative shift is mediated by group status threat, then providing participants with information that mitigates that threat should reduce the size of the shift. Their third experiment had three conditions. Some participants were given the racial shift information. The control group was again told about geographic mobility. And finally, there was an assuaged-threat condition. Two sentences were added to the racial shift information reassuring the respondents that, despite the majority-minority shift, white privilege would be maintained. Specifically, “white Americans are expected to continue to have higher average incomes and wealth compared to other racial groups.” Some new social policy questions were also added.

As expected, only the racial shift group showed a conservative shift on the social policy questions. The participants in the assuaged-threat condition did not differ from the control group.

It should be noted the authors divided their social policy questions into those they thought were race-related, i.e., immigration, and those they thought were not, i.e., health care reform. The size of the conservative shift was the same on both sets of questions. This result would not surprise Lopez, since he maintains that virtually all domestic political issues have been racialized. For example, the term “Obamacare” is a dog whistle meant to persuade white voters—incorrectly, of course—that their heard-earned money is being taken by the government and given to “Obama's people”—undeserving minority citizens.

The Craig and Richeson article may help Republicans to identify another reliable dog whistle, although Pat Buchanan called it to their attention years ago. The majority-minority shift is sometimes said to foretell the demise of the Republican Party. However, in the short run, it is likely to increase the racial polarization of the two parties, and it may help Republicans temporarily by increasing their appeal to white voters. Lopez suggests that whether the Republican Party can remain viable in the long run may depend on their ability to persuade some non-whites, i.e., Asian-Americans and light-skinned Hispanics, to redefine themselves as “white.”

You may also be interested in reading:

Dog Whistle Politics

The Singer, Not the Song

Old-Fashioned Racism

In Denial

Political scientist Brendan Nyhan was on All In with Chris Hayes last night (March 11) for a discussion of the Julia Boonstra television ad. The political ad, which was financed by the Koch Brothers' PAC, Americans for Prosperity, is running in Michigan in an early attempt to discredit Democratic Senatorial candidate Gary Peters. In it, Ms. Boonstra, a cancer patient, claims that her health insurance was cancelled due to the Affordable Care Act, that she can't afford the alternative policy offered to her, and that she is afraid she will die as a result. The ad was awarded three Pinocchios by the Washington Post after it was discovered that the alternative policy actually would save her $1200 a year. Her response was, “I personally do not believe that,” and that it “can't be true.”

This ad is part of a larger campaign in which Republican organizations trot out Obamacare “victims” to tell stories that are almost always misleading. Journalists eventually debunk these stories, but many more people hear the lie on television than read the truth in a newspaper, and even those who are told that the story is false often refuse to believe it.

Brendan Nyhan has been doing research for several years which shows that attempts to correct misinformation fail when they oppose people's deeply entrenched political ideologies. In fact, they can backfire and produce a boomerang effect—attitude change in the direction opposite to that intended by the speaker. Dr. Nyhan's latest study, released just last week, was an attempt to dispel the myth popular among conservatives that the measles, mumps and rubella vaccination (MMR) causes autism. Here's some background on the controversy from Aaron Carroll.

In the study, a nationally representative sample of 1759 young parents were randomly assigned to receive one of four pro-vaccine messages or a control message, delivered via the internet. The pro-vaccine messages, all taken from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) website, were:

1. Autism correction—written scientific evidence debunking the vaccination-autism link.
2. Disease risks—written descriptions of symptoms and risks associated with measles, mumps and rubella.
3. Disease narrative—a dramatic narrative in which a mother tells how her baby almost died from the measles.
4. Disease images—photographs of children suffering from symptoms of the three diseases.

The control group received an article about the costs and benefits of bird feeding. Nyhan measured the belief that the MMR causes autism, the belief that the MMR has serious side effects, and whether the participants intended to have their next child vaccinated, both before exposure to one of the messages and again about two weeks later.

The results were disappointing. Compared to the control group, the autism correction message significantly reduced the belief that the MMR causes autism. That was the only intended effect. The other three significant results were all boomerang effects. The disease narrative increased the belief that the MMR has serious side effects. The disease images increased the belief that the MMR causes autism. And finally, the autism correction resulted in parents reporting that they would be less likely to vaccinate future children. This latter effect was strongest for those parents who initially believed that the vaccine causes autism.

Ordinarily we should not make too much of studies that demonstrate no significant change. After all, the CDC messages could have been ineffective for a variety of reasons not immediately apparent to a reader of the study. It's also possible that different messages or combinations of messages might have worked. However, these were statistically significant backfire effects, and they should probably be taken seriously. The tendency of beliefs to persist or grow stronger even when the evidence for them is shown to be false is known as belief perseverance. The widely-accepted explanation for perseverance effects is self-persuasion. When people hear a message they disagree with, they counterargue with it. In the process, they expose themselves to their own counterarguments and persuade themselves to change their attitudes in the opposite direction from the message.

In the short run, at least, social scientists are becoming known in the media for delivering a depressing message: Factual information is ineffective in changing people's ideologically-motivated attitudes. So far, we have been unable to propose effective strategies for breaking through the barriers imposed by politically-inspired misinformation.

You may also be interested in reading:

Death By Anecdote, Part 1

The Open and Closed Mind

Motivated Reasoning

Public Getting Warmer

Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), co-chairs of the Bicameral Task Force on Climate Change, released some surprising new public opinion data earlier this week. The data were prepared by social psychologist Jon Krosnick of Stanford's Woods Institute for the Environment. Krosnick did a secondary analysis of 21 random-digit telephone surveys and internet surveys conducted, mostly by Stanford, between 2006 and 2013, with a total sample size of almost 20,000 respondents. Krosnick's mathematical model looked at changes over time, and the data he presented are his best estimate of public opinion today.

The results show that there is broad consensus among the American public that climate change is happening and that government should do something about it. Here are the percentages in each state who believe global warming is happening.

The overwhelming majority agree, not only in liberal states like New York (84%) and California (82%), but also in conservative states like Mississippi (82%) and Texas (84%). At least 75% of residents in every state surveyed believe in the existence of climate change. (There were a couple of states for which Krosnick lacked enough data to make a reliable estimate.) Sixty-five percent or more in every state believe that global warming is caused by humans, and 58% or more believe that it poses a serious problem for the United States. Krosnick believes that personal experience with hot weather is primarily responsible for these opinion changes. 

There was only slightly less agreement on whether the U. S. government should take action to address climate change. In only four sparsely populated Western states (ID, MT, NV, UT) did the majority not agree that the government should do more. Here are the percentages by state who believe government should limit greenhouse gas emissions from U. S. businesses.

Similar majorities favor limiting emissions of greenhouse gases from power plants, tax breaks to produce renewable energy, and a cap-and-trade system to limit greenhouse gas production. You can go to this site to check out the maps for all the questions that were reported. If you would like to take a closer look at Pennsylvania's results, they are here.

Where did the public draw the line? In only five states did bare majorities endorse tax breaks for nuclear power. And in no state did a near-majority endorse consumption taxes on gasoline or electricity, or government support for all-electric cars.

These data are not new, but they seem to be sharply at odds with previous statements about American public opinion on climate change made by politicians and the corporate media. The consistency across states is particularly surprising. Here is Krosnick's take on how American public opinion is represented politically.

I have often heard legislators in Washington express the belief that there is considerable variation in opinions about global warming across parts of the country, and that most of the people in their state or district are skeptical about global warming. When I ask about the polling they have done that led them to this belief, I have routinely been told that they had not done polling and, instead, base their impressions on phone calls, emails and conversations with and from constituents on the issue. Our findings suggest that the balance of those direct communications from constituents to elected representatives may have created a misimpression of the public's opinions on the issue.

My guess is that Krosnick is trying to be diplomatic. This is not the first time politicians have been show to misperceive voter attitudes. Not only do Congresspeople not hear from a random sample of constituents, the ones they do hear from are primarily large campaign contributors.

Now that these data are available to Congress, we will have yet another opportunity to observe whether the American political system is responsive to public opinion. Would you like to estimate the chances of these surveys having an impact?

You may also be interested in reading:

Reality Shows a Slight Gain

The Myth of the Conservative Voter

Whose Opinion Matters?

The Myth of the Conservative Voter

The obvious fact that majority public opinion is unable to prevail in Washington has set off a flurry of research on why the political system is so unresponsive. The latest contribution comes from David Broockman of the University of California, Berkeley, and Christopher Skovron of the University of Michigan. They sent surveys by mail and email to all of the 2012 candidates for state legislatures in the country. The response rate was 19.5% (1907 candidates), which is about double the typical response rate for mail and email surveys. The candidates were asked to estimate what percentage of their constituents would agree with the following statements:

1. Same sex couples should be allowed to marry.
2. Implement a universal healthcare program to guarantee coverage to all Americans, regardless of income.
3. Abolish all federal welfare programs.

They were also asked their own opinions on the first two issues. A new technique called multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) was used to estimate the attitudes of the citizens in each legislative district. It would obviously be very costly to survey the entire voting population each of the country's 6500 state legislative districts. MRP uses national survey data to determine level of agreement with the three statements based on education, race, gender, social class, religiosity and having voted for Obama. The percentage of people in each of these demographic subgroups in each legislative district is determined from the 2010 census. This generates an accurate estimate of the opinions of the people in each district. Although indirect, this method has been validated against real survey data.

There were positive correlations (rs = .43 to .51) across districts between the candidates' estimates and actual opinions, but they are not very impressive, accounting for only about 20% of the variance. The interesting thing about the data is that the candidates' perceived their constituents to be about 10% more conservative on these issues than they actually were, a difference roughly equal to the average difference between voters in California and Alabama. Stated differently, 60% of citizens would have to favor a liberal policy in order for their legislators to perceive them as a majority.

The responses were analyzed separately for liberal and conservative candidates based on their own answers to political questions. These data are shown in the table above. The horizontal axis represents the actual opinions in each district, and the vertical axis is the politicians' estimates. The black line is perfect accuracy. Anthing below it means the politicians are overestimating their constituents' conservatism. The blue line is the estimates of the liberal politicians, and the red line, the estimates of the conservatives. Although both groups believed their constituents were more conservative than they actually were, the conservatives seemed to be living in another world. They were off by over 20%. Nearly half the conservative candidates believed their district was more conservative than the actual opinions of the most conservative district in the entire country.

These findings may help us understand differences in the personal style of politicians. The well-known tendency of liberal politicians not to stand up for their beliefs contrasts sharply with the overconfidence of conservatives. Both may be explained by their fundamental misperceptions of public opinion.

Candidates were surveyed again after the election, but there was no evidence that they had learned anything. They were no more accurate than before, and their accuracy was unrelated to any of the activities they reported during the campaign, i.e., time spent talking with voters.

The first question about these data is their generalizability. The study should be replicated using federal and local as well as state candidates, and with a wider variety of issues. However, the differences are quite large, so I assume these findings are robust. How can they be explained? Broockman and Skovron do not speculate other than to suggest that political elites are not motivated to learn the attitudes of the people they represent.

Before giving them a political spin, we must be sure these errors are unique to politicians. It's possible that a random sample of the population might make errors of a similar magnitude and direction. If so, the data represent cultural influences to which we are all exposed. For example, the corporate media present an almost unrelentingly conservative view of the American public opinion, insisting that this is a “center-right” nation and referring to right-wing politicians as “moderates.” These data may reflect back what the media inaccurately tell us. The liberal-conservative difference may mean that the media outlets preferred by conservatives are even less accurate than those preferred by liberals.

Suppose the general public does not make errors that are comparable to these candidates—that is, these biases are unique to politicians. If these politicians are themselves more conservative than the general public, there might be a false consensus effect. False consensus refers to the tendency to assume that other people's opinions are more similar to our own than they actually are, to project our own beliefs onto others. There is reason to believe that political candidates are more conservative than the people they seek to represent, since so much money is required to run for office—either their own money or funds obtained from wealthy donors.

This shades into a second possibility, which we might call the “loudest voices” hypothesis. When considering this hypothesis, remember that money talks too. In fact, the Supremes have ruled that money is speech.

Suppose there are two types of political issues, economic and social. Economic issues are those issues that have major economic consequences, even they are sometimes debated using non-economic arguments. Therefore, they include not just taxation and public spending, but issues like climate change, health care, and foreign policy, including debates over war and peace. In the present study, health care and welfare are economic issues.

When the issue is economic, the loudest voices politicians are exposed to are those of campaign donors, whose views are well to the right of the general public. In fact, politicians may spend much of their time inside a bubble filled with rich contributors and corporate lobbyists. If you spend most of your time talking to these people, you are not likely to arrive at an accurate perception of what the general public thinks.

Social issues are those that have only minor economic consequences, such as abortion, gay rights and gun control. Although they are sometimes called “sideshow issues,” they are as important to some people as economic issues. For example, if you are pregnant, whether you have access to a safe, legal abortion is a matter of life and death. Social issues are represented in this study by gay marriage.

When the issue is social, political pressure comes primarily from grassroots organizations. Sadly, the loudest voices the politicians hear almost invariably come from the right. Conservatives are better organized, perhaps because they hold their attitudes with greater strength. Of course, what we call “grassroots” is sometimes actually astroturf. These groups receive financial and logistical help from the wealthy, since rich people know that they benefit when conservative candidates are elected.

Therefore, the loudest voices hypothesis suggests that, regardless of whether the issue is economic or social, the candidates hear mainly conservative voices. This is especially true of candidates who are themselves to the right of center. You can get a pretty distorted view of public opinion that way. Ask Mitt Romney.

Tom Corbett to PA's Working Poor: "Drop Dead!"

Part 4. What We Can Do

On Tuesday, February 5, PA Governor Tom Corbett stated that at this time he cannot recommend accepting $38 billion in federal funding to expand Medicaid, thereby denying medical assistance to more than 700,000 Pennsylvanians. So far, I've discussed empirical studies demonstrating that Medicaid improves health and saves lives, the costs and benefits of Medicaid, how those costs and benefits are distributed in Pennsylvania, and the governor's stated reasons for rejecting Medicaid expansion.

The conclusion to this series has proven to be the most difficult to write. I've already had to change the “tomorrow” in part 3 to “next time.” It's time to tie the loose ends together.

First, let me try to justify the rude title of these posts. As previously noted, the Sommers, et al, study contains an estimate of the number of lives saved by Medicaid expansion.

Results correspond to 2840 deaths prevented per year in states with Medicaid expansions, in which 500,000 adults acquired coverage. This finding suggests that 176 additional adults would need to be covered by Medicaid in order to prevent one death per year.

Granted, this is just an estimate. The real number may be somewhat higher or lower, but both mortality and Medicaid enrollment statistics in this country are usually pretty accurate. Corbett's decision will deny health insurance to 719,000 Pennsylvanians whose income is between 46% and 100% of the Federal poverty level. This too is an estimate based on 2010 census data. Using these two estimates, we can compute the number of lives per year that would be saved by Medicaid expansion.

719,000/176 = 4085

I think we can safely estimate that Corbett's decision sentences approximately 4000 Pennsylvanians to death per year, at least for the first five years (the duration of the Sommers study). These lives will be lost in order to save the state (by Corbett's estimate) $4.1 billion over eight years, while simultaneously turning down $37.8 billion in Medicaid funds from the Federal government.

Gov. Tom Corbett

As if to add insult to injury, Corbett has been extremely generous to Pennsylvania's corporate class. His budget projects that corporate tax revenues will drop $311 million (-5.9%) in 2013-14, due mostly to rate cuts in the capital stock and franchise tax beginning in 2014. He proposes to gradually phase out this tax. He also proposes to gradually eliminate the corporate income tax beginning in 2015. Corbett has pledged $1 billion in corporate welfare to Shell Oil to attract a $5 billion ethane cracker plant to Western Pennsylvania. (These are not saltines; they are dirty petrochemicals.) This plant will create hundreds of jobs, far fewer than Medicaid expansion. And Act 13, which imposes a minimal “impact fee” on natural gas drillers, has been described as “the nation's worst corporate giveaway.” Meanwhile, the Governor is not proposing to close tax loopholes, such as the Delaware loophole, which allows two-thirds of Pennsylvania corporations to completely avoid income tax.

I would argue that the humanitarian and economic arguments in favor of Medicaid expansion are overwhelming. In addition, Medicaid expansion would be easy to incorporate into a single-payer system, should the state or the nation move in that direction. I suggest that as health care advocates we immediately begin to lobby for Medicaid expansion with all the enthusiasm we can generate.

The economic logic of Medicaid expansion is so strong, and there are so many powerful economic interests that support it, I think that we will ultimately find ourselves on the winning side of this debate. Here are some of the reasons to be optimistic:

• Governor Corbett's announcement rejecting Medicaid expansion contained the hedge words “at this time,” suggesting that he may be open to changing his mind.
• He will face serious pressure from hospitals that, instead of gaining new customers, face financial losses as a result of having to provide medical services to the uninsured (“forced charity”). Other segments of the health care industry, such as pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies, are also seeing dollar signs disappearing.
• Since Medicaid expenditures ultimately circulate throughout the economy, it's likely that Chambers of Commerce and other business interests will come out in favor of expansion.
• Public opinion data collected last Summer showed 49% of Americans favor of Medicaid expansion in their state and 43% opposed. The number in favor should increase as the costs and benefits become more clear.
• The fact that several other Republican governors who initially opposed expansion, such as Govs. Brewer of Arizona, Kasich of Ohio and Snyder of Michigan, have decided to accept it has cast Corbett in the role of an ideological extremist.
• Since Pennsylvania Democrats who have spoken out so far seem to be unanimous in their support of Medicaid expansion, it may take only a few high profile Republican defectors to convince the Governor that he doesn't have majority support.
• I hedged my statement by saying “ultimately.” Even if it isn't decided to expand Medicaid this year, there is nothing to prevent Pennsylvania from accepting it in the future, should Gov. Corbett not be re-elected and the political balance of power in Harrisburg change.

However, there is no justification for complacency. The stakes for Pennsylvania's working poor are too high.

I've previously reviewed research showing that wealthy people have the greatest influence on political decisions in this country, the influence of the middle class is much less, and the influence of the poor is virtually nonexistent. This suggests that the occasional successes progressive activists have are usually due to our interests temporarily coinciding with those of much more powerful economic forces. For example, passage of the Affordable Care Act itself may have had little to do with providing health care to uninsured Americans, except insofar as this provided the cover story for a massive transfer of wealth from the government to health insurance, pharmaceutical, and other health care corporations.

Medicaid expansion is another instance in which our preference coincides with that of important segments of the economic ruling class. Our support may make a difference; we will never know for sure. But even if Medicaid expansion occurs for reasons having nothing to do with anything we say or do, this is an excellent opportunity for health care advocates to renew their faith in the effectiveness of progressive activism.

I expect more sophisticated analyses of the costs and benefits of Medicaid expansion to become available soon. Meanwhile, if you would like to reprint this analysis or if you want me to edit it down to meet your needs, please let me know.

You may also be interested in reading:

Tom Corbett to PA's Working Poor:  "Drop Dead!" (Part 1)

Tom Corbett to PA's Working Poor:  "Drop Dead!" (Part 2)

Tom Corbett to PA's Working Poor:  "Drop Dead!" (Part 3)

Whose Opinion Matters?

On Monday, the Senate voted 51-45 (nine votes short of the supermajority needed) to block debate on the Buffett Rule that would have required millionaires to pay an income tax rate of at least 30%. A CNN poll showed that 72% of Americans favored the rule. This is just one of many policies—from ending the war in Afghanistan to providing a public option for health insurance—that were favored by a majority of Americans, but not by corporations or wealthy Americans, that have been defeated. How responsive is our political system to public opinion? And to whose opinions does it respond?

These questions are difficult to answer. Prevailing research can only tell us how well legislation corresponds to public opinion, and whose opinions it matches. In other words, we can look at the correlations between the attitudes of the population—or population subgroups—and political decisions. But if a positive correlation is found, that doesn't necessarily mean that the people are influencing their legislators' votes. The politicians could have persuaded the public to accept their policies. Or both the public and their legislators could be reponding to a variety of third variables, such as their shared background, real world events, or media coverage of political issues. Therefore, instead of talking about the public's “influence” on politicians, I will refer to the “consistency” between their opinions.

Early studies of consistency used the box-score method, comparing the majority preference on a particular issue, as indicated by public opinon polls, to subsequent legislative decisions. Chance alone would ensure that legislators would agree with the majority half the time even if they completely disregarded public opinion. Political scientist Alan Monroe found that in over 500 Congressional decisions between 1980 and 1993, the outcomes corresponded with public opinion 55% of the time. This was better than chance agreement (50%), but not much better. If our legislators follow the wishes of the majority 55% of the time, does this mean that we have a responsive government? Monroe reports that between 1960 and 1979, agreement was 63%, so whatever it means, it's going down.

Larry Bartels studied differences in the consistency of U. S. Senators' votes with the attitudes of their constituents of different social classes. He measured the relationship between participants' self-ratings on a 7-point liberalism-conservatism scale and all the decisions made by their Senators between 1988 and 1992. The respondents were divided into approximately equal thirds by income. (For convenience, I'll call them the “rich,” the “middle class” and the “poor.”) Through a complex (but not controversial) mathematical procedure, Bartels estimated the “weight” that should be given to upper, middle and lower class opinion in order to produce the best match with the Senators' decisions.

The opinions of both the middle class and the rich corresponded with the choices of their Senators, but the weight associated with the opinions of the rich was about 50% greater than the weight of the middle class. The opinions of the poor, however, were given no weight at all. (Their opinions were actually slightly negatively related to their Senators' votes.) These class differences were not as great on social issues, such as abortion, as on economic issues, but in all categories, rich people's views were most consistent with the outcome, and the views of the poor were unrelated to the outcome. Of the specific bills Bartels studied, the greatest inequality occurred on a proposal to increase the minimum wage. Here, neither the wishes of the poor nor the middle class had any weight at all, and the decision corresponded exclusively to the opinions of the rich. (I don't need to tell you what the Senators decided.)

Bartels divided the Senators by party affiliation. He found that the Elephants' votes were about twice as consistent with the views of the rich as the Jackasses' votes. Both parties were equally responsive to middle class opinion and equally unresponsive to the poor.

Martin Gilens compared the results of surveys (conducted between 1981 and 2002) asking people whether they favored 1781 proposed policy changes to subsequent votes on those policies. This allowed him to locate the best-fitting curve relating public opinion to Congressional decisions. He found a strong status quo bias. That is, as the percentage of people favoring a policy change increased, its probability of being enacted also went up, but even when a policy had 90% support, its probability of passing was only 46%.

He then divided the country into ten deciles according to income, and compared the opinions of people who were richer than 90% of Americans to the opinions of eight other groups, all the way down to the 10^th percentile of the income distribution. He found that the votes were consistent with the preferences of all ten economic subgroups, but as wealth increased, the correpondence between their preference and the decision increased. However, this analysis may have overestimated the consistency of the attitudes of the poor with politicians' votes, since in most cases they agreed with the rich. Gilens then did an analysis of the 887 cases in which there was significant diagreement on the policy among people at different income levels. Here are two charts showing these results.

The top chart compares the consistency of legislators' votes with people at the 90^th and 10^th percentiles of the income distribution. The positive slope of the 90^th percentile line indicates that as more rich people favor the policy, its probability of passage goes up. On the other hand, the 10^th percentile line is flat, indicating that the opinions of the poor are unrelated to the outcome. The bottom chart compares the rich with the middle class (the 50^th percentile). Unlike the poor, the middle class appear to have some influence, but of course not as much as the rich.

Why do the views of the rich carry more weight? Maybe they're more likely to vote, more likely to contact their Senators, or more knowledgable about current events. The surveys Bartels used asked participants to state whether they had voted or contacted their Senators. It also included a measure of political knowledge. Since all three of these measures were positively related to income, they were all associated with greater consistency between the respondent's views and those of the Senators. However, statistically controlling for turnout, contact and political knowledge reduced the difference between the apparent influence of the rich and poor by only 24%.

Unfortunately, the survey did not ask participants whether they had made political contributions. Looking at other data on campaign contributions by income level collected at that time, Bartels estimated that if the Senators had based their decision only on contributions, they would have given six times (600%) more weight to the views of the rich than the middle class and almost no weight to the poor. The actual disparity in weight between the rich and the middle class (50%) was not as great as the differences in contributions would have predicted.

I'm bothered by the fact that in these studies the "rich" are defined as either the top third of the income distribution (Bartels) or the 90^th percentile (Gilens). These subgroups include some people who might be considered upper middle class. It would be interesting to know how consistent the opinions of the top 1% are with those of the politicians. Gilens data seem to imply that as wealth increases, agreement also increases. Is there any upper limit to this effect?

Of course, these data are mostly from the 1980s and 1990s.  Over time, both the absolute amounts and percentages of campaign contributions coming from the rich have increased. This is probably especially true since the 2010 Citizens United decision, which allows unlimited contributions by corporations and the rich. But since the decision also allows these contributions to be anonymous, their impact will be difficult to measure.

Those who believe the U. S. political system is a plutocracy rather than a democracy will find these data to be at least consistent with their theories, particularly on economic issues, although the middle class's opinions are given almost as much weight as those of the rich when the issue is of little economic importance. The poor, however, have been effectively disenfranchised when their opinions differ from those of the rich. Given the secrecy with which political decisions are made, it will be difficult to find conclusive proof of quid pro quo corruption.