For example, in one of the seven studies they report, participants read about a drought caused by a
river that dried up. In the intentional harm condition, they
were told that a man deliberately diverted the river, while in the
unintentional condition, the problem was said to be due to
lack of rain. The participants were then given a brief opportunity
to look at a list of monetary damages caused by the disaster, i.e.,
value of crops lost, etc., and asked to estimate the total
damages.
Estimated Total Harm
|
|
Actual Damage |
$2,862.00
|
Unintentional Harm |
$2,753.00
|
Intentional Harm |
$5,120.00
|
As you can see, those in the unintentional harm condition estimated the damages fairly accurately.
However, participants in the intentional harm condition gave a mean
estimate of harm that was almost twice the real damage. This
difference persisted even when participants were given a monetary
incentive for being accurate, and even when they were asked to give
separate estimates of total harm and any punitive damages they
might want to impose.
In some of their studies comparing
accidental vs. intentional harms caused by the same perpetrator,
Ames and Fiske measured blame motivation,
a combination of desire to blame, morally condemn and punish the
perpetrator. They found that the effect of intentionality on harm
estimates was mediated by—that
is, largely accounted for by—the motivation to blame the harm-doer.
(See this previous post for an explanation of how researchers infer
mediation.) Of course, it was not possible to do this analysis with
the drought scenario, since no person was responsible for the lack of
rain.
As
with all good studies, this one raises more questions than it
answers. The authors tentatively suggest that we may be overreacting to intentional acts such as the threat of terrorism, but neglecting
other impersonal threats. I'm intrigued by the fact that the
participants exaggerated the costs of intentional harms rather than
underestimating the costs of unintentional ones. This suggests that
we are more inclined to punish people who harm us deliberately than
to forgive those who harm us unintentionally. (Actually, I'm
combining the results of two separate studies to draw this
conclusion, but it doesn't seem far-fetched.) If so, is this more characteristic of Americans than of other cultures? Of conservatives
than of liberals?
In the
real world, important events have multiple causes whose exact
contributions are not clear. Most of us believe that Hurricane Katrina was not simply a natural disaster, but was caused in part by
failure to adequately build and maintain the levees, by failure of
FEMA to respond efficiently, etc.
Presumably, those who believe that human negligence played a
significant role will see Katrina as having been more harmful. How
will society assign blame for current and future disasters
attributable by climate change?
In
disasters where human agency is clearly involved, i.e.,
the BP oil spill, there will almost certainly be conflicting accounts
of who was responsible and whether the harm was deliberate or
accidental. How does the public respond to these controversies and
why? When safety precautions are disregarded, do they think the primary fault
lies with the corporations who disregard the rules or the government
regulators who fail to enforce them? What if these corporations
contribute to politicians who in turn weaken the rules or ensure that
regulatory agencies are understaffed?
There
are enough questions here to keep social psychologists occupied for
quite a while.
You may also be interested in reading:
Blaming the Victim
The Ultimate Attribution Error
You may also be interested in reading:
Blaming the Victim
The Ultimate Attribution Error
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