The Affordable Care Act provides for the establishment of ACOs to serve Medicare and Medicaid patients. Essentially, a group of health care providers (doctors and/or hospitals) form an ACO and sign a contract with the government to provide care for a large group of patients. They receive a bundled payment based only partially on services provided. Some part of the payment is based on the quality of the health care they provide and their ability to control costs.
In theory, cost control can be done by better coordination of patient care, for example, with the help of computerized records. Since so much of medical care is unnecessary or harmful, a lot of money could be saved, provided the incentives were greater than the profit to be made through overtreatment. It should at least be possible to measure whether money is being saved in comparison to the current fee-for-service system.
Measuring quality of care is more difficult. But it is crucial, since without it, the incentive structure of ACOs might encourage them to withhold necessary care from their patients. But what are the criteria of good health, and how could they be measured without incurring additional expense? Health care research focuses on hospital admissions and readmissions as an indicator that the patient is not healthy, but this is an imprecise measure of health which only becomes apparent after the patient's situation has deteriorated. Like other health indicators, it can be manipulated by denying treatment.
It is possible to imagine ACOs working well under Medicare with proper oversight from government. Nevertheless, there are problems. If an ACO is to be responsible for prevention as well as treatment, subscribers must remain in the system long enough for the ACO to reap the savings that come with prevention. This is possible in a single payer system, but not in this country where there is a lot of client turnover. Also, to be accountable for all their clients' health care needs, an ACO must include specialists in all health problems, which means it must be quite large. But large organizations have greater market share, which discourages competition and leads to higher prices—just the opposite of what ACOs are supposed to do.
However, Emanuel and Liebman are suggesting that ACOs will dominate the private health care market as well. In fact, hospitals are already buying out competitors and hiring more doctors, and insurance companies are merging with hospitals in anticipation of forming ACOs. This trend is evident in the Pittsburgh area. The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), the largest hospital chain, has bought out competitors and has gone into the health insurance business as well. Meanwhile Highmark, the region's largest health insurer, has purchased West Penn Allegheny, the only major hospital chain not owned by UPMC. Not surprisingly, this morning's paper reports that Pittsburgh has the highest hospital care costs of any city in the U. S.
Apparently we can look forward to a brave new world in which, when we purchase health insurance, either alone or through our employer, we affiliate with an ACO which promises to keep us in good health. But Austin Frakt, a health care policy expert who is sympathetic to ACOs, suggests that they “are fine and good for Medicare, but somebody needs to think through the consequences for the private side of the market.”
The dominant characteristic of today's corporations is that they are not accountable to anyone except perhaps their stockholders. A combined health insurance-medical care corporation will have strong financial incentives to charge as much as possible for health insurance while providing as little health care as possible in return. At least under the current system, the patient is caught between two corporations pushing in different directions. If their insurance company is trying to deny them care, there is a good chance that their doctor will come to their defense and insist that they receive medically necessary treatment. If the insurance company and the doctors are all part of the same corporation, who will defend the patient's interests? Without third party oversight, what is to keep the patients from being harmed when their very lives may be at stake?
It is possible that a conscientious employer might provide oversight of an ACO with which it affiliates, since companies may want to keep their employees healthy. However, this is certainly problematic, and, in any case, individual health care subscribers are on their own under this system. I don't see how the entire country can shift to ACOs without substantial government oversight. This, of course, will be strongly resisted by hospitals and insurance companies, in part because it would start to take on the characteristics of a single payer system.
Many countries—Germany, Japan and Switzerland are examples—have systems in which both health care providers and insurers are private entities. But these countries have tight government regulation of medical services and fees. These private entities are required to cover everyone and they are permitted to make only modest profits, if any. And why should they make large profits? Under a single payer system, insurance companies are completely unnecessary, while doctors and hospitals can be limited to a “reasonable” fee for their services. If they want to increase their income, maybe they should be allowed to compete for higher wages by demonstrating that they can keep their patients healthy and, as a consequence, control costs.
Although I have serious doubts as to whether ACOs will work in our private health care system, they may be a good idea when embedded within a single payer system.
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